<!-- saved from url=(0042)http://home.snafu.de/jonasw/JONAS4-62.html -->
<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Adobe PageMill 2.0 Mac">
<title>Wolfgang Jonas </title>
</head>
<body>
<p><a href="http://home.snafu.de/jonasw/index.html">erste Seite</a></p>
<p><a href="http://home.snafu.de/jonasw/JONAS4.html">Publikationen</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Wolfgang Jonas</p>
<p>09.05.2003</p>
<p>EAD 5, Barcelona, 28-30 April 2003</p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>Mind the gap! on knowing and not knowing in design</b></p>
<p>Or: there is nothing more theoretical than a good practice</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>0 Abstract</b></p>
<p>The question of design foundations, or, "common ground" is
open. Foundations are either "nothing" the very beginning
of cultural evolution, "Point Zero" (the stick and the stone),
or "everything" the history of what happened up to the present
moment. From "Point Zero" to now we had an endless cycle / spiral
/ "history" of construction and destruction of artefacts and knowledge,
or, of complexification (to avoid the overloaded word "learning").
And we have the moving "wavefront" of the present, where we experience
the similarity of designing and "science in action". Both are
acting in the hybrid swamp of artefacts, consciousnesses, communications
and human bodies.</p>
<p>But knowledge has different meaning, status and use in science and design.
Science is aiming at predictability, thus needs stable models, which deliver
"the same". Science has to purify its models in order to transfer
them from hypotheses into prediction machines. Bodies, consciousnesses,
communications and artefacts can be neatly split. Scientific problems are
solved, as long as the solution does not turn out to be false, which means
of less explanatory power compared to a new one. Design is aiming at single
phenomena that fit various unforeseeable conditions. Design has to intentionally
create variations, differences, because the "fits" dissolve, fade
away, get old-fashioned. Design environments change too fast to talk of
true or false design knowledge / facts. The archive of design knowledge
is like a memory, a growing reservoir of variation as well as restriction.
Expertise in design is the art of dealing with scientific and non-scientific
knowledge, with fuzzy knowledge, with outdated knowledge and with no knowledge
at all in order to achieve these value-laden fits. In other words: the art
of muddling through.</p>
<p>We are facing the paradox situation of increasing manipulative power
through science and technology and, at the same time, decreasing prognostic
control of its social consequences. Accepting these limits of project-oriented
science suggests a new role for design: more modest and more arrogant.</p>
<p>My conceptual tools for understanding the mechanisms that produce and
destroy design artefacts and knowledge comprise: (1) Sociological systems
theory (Luhmann) with the concept of autopoiesis, including the shift from
identity to difference, (2) evolution theory (Darwin, Luhmann), and (3)
evolutionary epistemology (Campbell, Riedl) and the concept of action research.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>1 Why Still Considering Design Foundations?</b></p>
<p><b><i>The discourse on design foundations is isolated and erratic. The
industrious and breathless "scientific" research activities have
to be backed up by a more coherent + flexible and less rigid theoretical
framework (= "foundation"), in order to promote the autonomy and
specific character of genuine design (research).</i></b></p>
<p> </p>
<p>In two papers I tackle the issue of foundations (Jonas 1999, 2000). The
first describes design theory as "a floating network of chunks of ideas",
without fixed epistemological core, acting in the interface region between
shifting reference spheres: the contextual and the artefactual. Some deliberately
provocative consequences were put forward, for example: there is <i>no progress
in design,</i> or: <i>design is amoral,</i> and has to be, in order to fulfil
its function. The second paper describes the interface as the "swamp",
which is a provisional metaphor for the hybrid mix of the natural, the human,
the social, the divine, which cannot provide foundations but only entry
points. Design has no foundations because design itself is the basic human
activity. Foundations might be emerging transitory patterns. Science is
also acting in the swamp (in their case called laboratory or field), but
science is obliged to purify and de-contextualize the facts constructed
there in order to protect its mythical image of being closer to the truth
than other ways of knowledge production. And I asked whether design should
follow this tempting but problematic program.</p>
<p>No doubt, design has reached considerable status and complexity:</p>
<p>- Dozens of professions are using the concept <i>design</i>. But what
are their commonalities apart from transferring existing states into new
(at best desired) ones?</p>
<p>- There is a growing sphere of <i>design research</i>. But what is the
design-specific aspect in these activities, except that they might be useful
in design tasks?</p>
<p>- Enormous canonical lists of apparently relevant knowledge fields and
disciplines (almost "everything") and well-established academic
rules are piled up and promoted (Friedman 2001). But is this creating "common
ground", or rather obscuring the lack of genuine foundations through
quantity and eloquence?</p>
<p>One could go further, addressing communication styles:</p>
<p>- Conferences are nice social events, and conferences produce proceedings,
which are, however, mostly not more than a collection of unconnected texts.</p>
<p>- Competition and rivalry ("I know better") is the prevailing
style. There are fierce debates, yet mainly concerning details of the respective
positions. Hardly anyone is looking for understanding or even connectivity
and possible links between different approaches.</p>
<p>- Fresh (to avoid the hackneyed word "innovative") ideas are
frequently marginalized as fringe positions or kicked out with reference
to academic standards that are not our own.</p>
<p>I do not want to be a spoilsport (and I do not at all question the current
efforts and achievements of design research in all its facets), but for
these reasons the loud suggestion of foundations and progress sounds like
magic spell. It may appear futile, or, even narrow-minded to stick to this
point; but I am convinced, that, in order to develop a genuine design identity,
it is necessary to keep the question of foundations open and alive. This
comprises ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects:</p>
<p><b>(1) Is there an essence of design / designing? </b></p>
<p><b>(2) What is the overall function of design? </b></p>
<p><b>(3) What is the specific nature of knowing in design? </b></p>
<p><b>(4) What about the relation design / science? </b></p>
<p><b>(5) How to improve the process of "problem-solving" through
research?</b></p>
<p>One may object, that the very product of designing, the artefact, is
missing. In my view artefacts are not central, they are necessary but <i>contingent</i>
materializations in the never-ending process, which can, at best, be interpreted
<i>retrospectively</i> (with benefits for further projects, of course).</p>
<p>After the "Common Ground" conference in September 2002 there
was a short discussion of the observation, that, for some people, the event
did not meet the expectations raised by the ambitious metaphor. The debate
was cut off by the laconic answer of the organisers, that it was "a
title, not a theme". This is not satisfactory, since theoretical contributions,
explicitly addressing the issue of foundations, reveal a proper "carnival
of opinions"(Jonas 2001-2003). We should mind the traps and deadlocks
of this endeavour. Speaking of "common ground" claims the description
of the whole of design from a position inside design. Normative fixations
and quasi-religious formulae are frequent outcomes of such auto-logical
situations of self-reference and paradox. They cover the necessary singularity
and fluidity of all self-observations and entice us to take the map for
the terrain.</p>
<p>Can there be foundations with axioms, laws and scientific methods? Or
do we have to accept the concept of elegantly "muddling through"?
Any attempt to fix foundations leads to the question: what is the foundation
of these foundations? The "Münchhausen-trilemma" shows up
(Münchhausen was the guy who pretended to have pulled himself and his
horse out of the groundless swamp by his own pigtail, see Albert 1968),
leaving the options of infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatic postulation.
Love (2002) is looking for foundations on a very basic neuro-physiological
level. His explanations based on biology will end up in infinite regress,
I fear. Buchanan (2001) introduces "generative principles". Where
do they come from? They are generated, but they reveal a nice circular aspect,
as will be shown. Friedman (2001) defines some concepts and concludes: there
are foundations, and basta! In my view, a mix of circularity + time (= "spirality")
seems to be promising.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>2 Foundations by Definition and Deduction?</b></p>
<p><b><i>We tend to stick to the inappropriate expectation of being able
to tackle polymorphous phenomena (design, progress, foundations) by means
of sharpened definitions and formal conclusions. Fuzzy concepts may better
be grasped through illustrating the core of the term by means of analogies.
This means a shift from a definitory (binary) towards a transitory (fuzzy)
logic.</i></b></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Friedman (2001) took a critical look at the papers mentioned (Jonas 1999,
2000). The following is a part of an imaginary dialogue (see also Jonas
2002), i.e. I reply to his critique, concentrating on the questions of overall
<i>style</i> and the issues of <i>progress</i> and <i>foundations</i>. His
main critique: <i>"The arguments against the concept of foundations
are intuitionist in nature."</i></p>
<p>K.F.:</p>
<p><i>" These papers outline problems and issues without defining them.
Opening the problem space allows us to reflect. Closing the problem space
through robust definitions allows us to begin the search for solutions."</i></p>
<p>W.J.:</p>
<p>The basic problems mentioned cannot be defined in a manner you would
accept; definitions are not available. The concept of <i>interface</i> clearly
refers to Simon and Alexander and their notions of design as interface discipline.
"Robust" definitions might kill the problem before the search
for solutions has even started. The idea that the problem space has to be
closed in order to proceed towards solutions is inappropriate. Since the
early 1970s we could know that in ill-defined, wicked problem situations
problems and solutions evolve in a parallel process. If at all, the problem
can be stated when a solution is achieved. And then the solution is the
problem! I am convinced that this is true for design problems as well as
for design theory problems.</p>
<p>K.F.:</p>
<p><i>"The growth of design knowledge, the steady history of improvements
in design practice, the dramatic development of design research, and the
gradual development of design teaching, all indicate progress.</i></p>
<p><i>Progress is not uniform. Comprehensive progress is impossible. Nevertheless,
there is relatively wide agreement in our field that we are meeting Bunge´s
(1999: 227) definition of progress as a ´process of improvement in
some regard and to some degree´ in all four areas of design.</i></p>
<p><i>The state of physics in 1895 offers a good comparison for our field.
Because we are a different kind of field, we cannot hope to make the fundamental
progress that physics has made over the past 100 years. Even so, we can
hope to grow if we focus on a progressive research program.</i></p>
<p> </p>
<p><i>Progress in research and in practice depends on prior art. This is
another way of stating that progress requires foundations. If there is progress
and there is there must be foundation(s). There is progress
in design. QED: design has foundations." </i></p>
<p>W.J.:</p>
<p>There is an interesting rule, or axiom: "Progress requires foundations."
And as we have progress, we have foundations. This is a nice circle, or
syllogism / deduction, which fails immediately if one does not believe in
your definition of progress and your postulation of progress in design.
In my old-fashioned view progress comprises (1) an increase in scientific
"truth" (there is progress e.g. in physics; but in design?), (2)
an improvement of the human condition, the claim that Galilei and Bacon
stated for science (there is progress in many fields; but through design?),
and, (3) the utopian claim of enlightenment thinking: better human beings
(no progress here!). But I do not accuse design for not showing much progress
in this sense, because, as I argued, design is the agency of bridging the
gap, the interface. There is no reference point for defining progress, but
merely fit or non-fit. Is Mac OS X a design progress compared with OS 9,
or just an increase in functional complexity?</p>
<p>Parallels with physics or even mathematics seem inappropriate. Maybe
there are parallels to the situation of the Design Methods Movement (and
the "design science decade") some 40 years ago: an exponential
growth in rigidity and then a collapse with important insights: that there
are <i>designerly ways of knowing</i>, that design problems are mostly <i>ill-defined,
embedded, situated</i>, etc.</p>
<p>Today we are in a situation when other disciplines realize the fragile,
fluid, historical character of their respective "grounds". We
should beware of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (A.N.
Whitehead), which means that if we possess a word, to avoid the conclusion
that there would be a thing indicated by this word. To put it quite simply:
<i>What are we talking about when we are talking about design and design
research?</i></p>
<p>I do not reject "systematic" inquiry. But this must not necessarily
be the same as, e.g., in the social sciences. Refreshing and inspired <i>designerly</i>
ways of inquiry are possible (Dunne and Raby 2001).</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>3 Foundations Through "Generative Principles"?</b></p>
<p><b><i>"Generative principles" are first of all generated principles.
In order to come closer to foundations we have to look at the underlying
evolutionary mechanisms, which are able to "generate principles".</i></b></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Buchanan's (2001: 67-84) "ecology of culture" could well be
compared to my notorious "swamp". In stating, that <i>"We
tend to dismiss the way human beings have formed their beliefs in response
to the natural and human environment"</i> he explicitly introduces
an evolutionary concept. In developing our paths of thinking, we depend
upon the philosophical assumptions that stand behind our basic beliefs,
the contingency of which is not made explicit, however. Mostly they rest
in a pre-conscious state of mind. In order to render them more explicit
Buchanan identifies, or invents, four "generative principles"
as generators for the various, sometimes incompatible, patterns of design
theorizing today. His scheme shows two dimensions: the phenomenal processes
(A) and the ontic conditions (B), each with two typical faces, so that a
nice cross-scheme is showing up, an example of theory as design:</p>
<p>A: Phenomenal.</p>
<p>The underlying assumption is <i>"that design is best understood
by our experience of it "</i></p>
<p>A1: Experience and environment.</p>
<p>The focus lies <i>"on the problems that human beings encounter in
their environment. It seeks to identify and integrate multiple causes of
design rather than reducing it to a single cause. ".</i> The four Aristotelian
causes are showing up.</p>
<p>A2: Agent.</p>
<p>The focus lies on <i>"the agent who performs an action. Design is
shaped by the actions that human beings take in creating and projecting
meaning into the world. This existential, operational approach is </i>exemplary<i>
in its key features. It looks for successful examples of design practice
in the past or present for models that may guide future ventures in designing.
"</i></p>
<p>B: Ontic.</p>
<p>The underlying assumption is that there are <i>"´real and
ultimate´ conditions that determine design in human experience "</i>.</p>
<p>B1: Underlying forces.</p>
<p>The focus lies on <i>"underlying natural forces and material reality.
The paradigm of design is engineering, since engineering is closest to the
natural conditions that are the ´real and ultimate´ conditions
of human life. This approach looks to the conditions that have shaped the
past and seeks to project the trends of fundamental forces and movements
into the future "</i>.</p>
<p>B2: Transcendent ideas.</p>
<p>The focus lies on "<i>ideas and ideals that transcend the necessities
and contingencies of physical or material culture and the limitations of
individual, personal experience. This vision is always oriented toward an
ideal of beauty, truth, or justice that transcends and permeates the world
of human experience, giving structure to meaning and values. ".</i></p>
<p>Thus an explanatory structure for the chaotic image of design theory
building is offered. The scheme as a whole reveals a strong Platonic appearance,
which Buchanan only attributes to principle B2. It seems to float in an
eternal realm of ideas, producing the puzzling variety of the phenomenal
world of design theories. But where does it come from? Can it be integrated
into a more generative model of knowledge production? The answer is contained
in the scheme itself. Buchanan - between the lines - seems to be in favour
of principle A1: Experience and environment. Humans´ experiences lead
to personal attitudes, preferences, and styles. In consequence, theories
of how the world (or design) works will come up, according to those preferences.
Buchanan´s four principles are one of these emerging theories, which,
in turn, through their dissemination (Design Issues is an effective replicator)
influence personal attitudes, preferences, and styles in the community,
and which shape the further conditions of our experiences. "Generative
principles" are generated, before the evolutionary generative background
of 2500 years of Western philosophy.</p>
<p>To sum up: Generative principle A1 seems to be a bit "more basic"
than the rest, because it contains the other ones plus itself. This shows
the fractal character and self-reference of design theory, and, this is
important, allows, to integrate the "Buchanan meme" into the general
process of knowledge generation.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>4 A Foundation: Evolutionary Epistemology</b></p>
<p><b><i>Evolutionary epistemology provides the most basic generative mechanism
to explain learning in the living world, thus explaining the ongoing production
and re-production of both artefacts and knowledge, finally of design and
science as dynamic forms.</i></b></p>
<p><b><i>This is the "essence" (</i> see <i>question 1). </i></b></p>
<p><b><i>There is no need for any specific nature of knowing in design (</i>see
<i>question 3).</i></b></p>
<p> </p>
<p>A Darwinian mechanism of (1) mutation (2) selection (3) re-stabilization
and so forth is showing up: (1) Jonas introduces a new concept, which
might be called a mutation, creative act, intentional provocation, or whatever
an observer might prefer. (2) Friedman acts as a selective environment,
contesting the proposition. (3) The chunk of ideas survives in this
"struggle for life", the interaction of the system (Jonas´
ideas) and the context (Friedman´s critique). The concept is re-stabilized.
(1´) Buchanan's new appealing chunk of ideas appears, which
Jonas tries to integrate. (2´) Someone might act as a selective
mechanism, and so forth. In contrast to a genetic process in biology this
is a <i>memetic</i> process. The "chunks of ideas" that are transferred
might be considered as <i>memes</i> or <i>memplexes</i> (Dawkins 1976, Blackmore
1999). The essential observation up to now is, that<i> learning cycles</i>
(I switch to the familiar "learning" now) might emerge in design
debates, if only there were debates.</p>
<p>The basis of our learning processes, which are the epistemological core
of design, can be considered as biological, grounded in the need of organisms
to survive in an environment. The aim cannot be true representation of some
external reality, but <i>(re-) construction</i> for the purpose of appropriate
<i>(re-) action</i>. Even Aristotle suspected, that the recognizability
of the world must rely on the fact, that there is a kind of similarity between
the "particles" of the world and those in our senses. The history
of biological evolution indeed suggests similarities of the way the material
world is structured and the way we think of the world. Evolutionary epistemologists
(Campbell 1974) argue that the Kantian transcendental apriori has to be
replaced by the assumption of an evolutionary fit between the objects and
the subject of recognition.</p>
<p>The evolutionary model of knowledge production presents a spiral scheme
with structural identity from the molecular up to the cognitive and cultural
level (Riedl 2000). The basic structure reveals a circle of trial (expectation)
and experience (success or failure, confirmation or refutation), of action
and reflection. Starting with passed and driven by new cases, the circle
consists of an inductive / heuristic semi-circle with purposeful learning
from experience, leading to hypotheses and theories and prognoses about
how the world works, and a deductive / logical semi-circle with the confirmation
or refutation of theories. Depending on the purposes and desired outcomes
we have design or science.</p>
<p>Only very recently in the cultural evolution this general scheme was
split into the ratiomorphous (the term was coined by Konrad Lorenz) systems
of recognition and the rational systems of explanation / understanding,
with its most extreme form: the logical positivist dualism of "context
of discovery" (acting) vs. "context of justification" (thinking).</p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>Recognition (Erkennen) - Explanation (Erklären / Verstehen)</b></p>
<p>networks, many causes - linear cause effect relations</p>
<p>simultaneous (simul hoc) - sequential (propter hoc)</p>
<p>4 Aristotelian causes considered - only causa efficiens considered</p>
<p>only local validity, context is crucial - global validity claimed, context
excluded</p>
<p>allows no experiments, mostly irreversible - relies on experiments, mostly
reversible</p>
<p>prognosis is projection - prognosis is forecasting</p>
<p>correspondence of organism / artefact in a milieu - coherence of elements
inside a system</p>
<p>reaches into high complexity - reduces complexity</p>
<p>fitness, "truth" means strong design - "truth" means
correct causal relations</p>
<p>is labelled "pre-scientific" - is labelled "scientific"</p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>Table: </b>Erkennen vs. Erklären (Riedl 2000: 53 55).</p>
<p> </p>
<p>While the ratiomorphous process of recognition has a high potential in
dealing with complex, evolving phenomena, it is not always useful for causal
explanations, and vice versa. But this "dilemma" is not inherent
in the nature of knowledge production, but rather a consequence of the dualistic
concept, which we have imposed on it. The path from recognition to explanation
is continuous and circular, sometimes with dead ends. Our language is too
poor, or, too much locked in the "black&white" tradition of
scientifically determined thinking, to express the beautiful transitory
shades of "grey" between the poles.</p>
<p>The argument of <i>naturalized epistemology</i> appears in various forms
and formulations. Another prominent representative is John Dewey (1986).
In his view processes of circular action, driven by intentionality, are
the essential core of knowledge generation. The separation of thinking as
pure contemplation and acting as bodily intervention into the world becomes
obsolete. Quite the reverse: Thinking depends on real world situations that
have to be met, initiated by the necessity to choose appropriate means with
regard to expected consequences. The projected active improvement of an
unsatisfactory, problematic situation is the primary motivation for thinking,
designing, and, finally - in a more refined, purified, quantitative manner
- for scientific research and knowledge production. Knowing is a manner
of acting and "truth" is exchanged by "warranted assertibility".</p>
<p>Schön´s (1983) epistemology of "reflective practice"
can be regarded as the design-related description of these concepts. It
is this unspecific pattern, which Cross (2001) characterizes as "designerly
ways of knowing":</p>
<p><i>"The underlying axiom of this discipline is that there are forms
of knowledge special to the awareness and ability of a designer, independent
of the different professional domains of design practice."</i></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>5 Another Foundation: Theory of Social Systems</b></p>
<p><b><i>Luhmann's theory of social systems provides the requisite complexity
to split the nice but simplistic concept of the "whole" human
being into autonomous subsystems. </i></b></p>
<p><b><i>Design(ing) is the discipline of creating contingent fits / interfaces
between bodies, consciousnesses and communications by means of artefacts
(see question 2).</i></b></p>
<p><b><i>The shift from identity to difference allows to handle the transitory
nature of apparently fixed concepts.</i></b></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Having accepted, or at least having taken note of the messy, swampy,
hybrid situation as it is, we can continue to describe the function of design
in society. According to the <i>interface</i> concept, introduced by Alexander
and Simon, design acts in the region between the artefactual and the contextual,
being responsible for the fit of objects and the contexts in which they
have to operate (or survive, in plain Darwinian terms). In order to make
this productive we have to overcome common sense notions and explicitly
introduce coherent systemic and evolutionary concepts. Luhmann (1997) states
ironically, that <i>"ontology is very close to common-sense plausibilities
- but nicer, more splendid, more thoughtful</i>", and shifts the emphasis
in systems thinking from the ontological distinction whole / parts to the
difference-theoretical distinction system / environment which is necessarily
depending on observation (= distinction + indication).</p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>identity</b> -</p>
<p>An "origin" is posited by a privileged observer.</p>
<p>Existence / non-existence as fixed primary distinction (Sein / Nichtsein).</p>
<p>Subdivision of the existing whole into parts.</p>
<p>System / elements.</p>
<p>Logical laws of identity, no contradiction, tertium non datur are valid.</p>
<p>Strictly bivalent logic - statements are true / false.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>difference</b></p>
<p>"Draw a distinction!" as initial request. No rule regarding
the initial distinction.</p>
<p>Marked / unmarked state, created through an observation (= distinction
+ indication).</p>
<p>System / environment.</p>
<p>The unity of the difference of marked and unmarked state is called "the
form of the distinction".</p>
<p>Crossing the distinction allows the negation and exchange of counter-terms.</p>
<p>This introduces a kind of trivalent logic - tertium datur.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>Table:</b> The shift from identity to difference (Luhmann 1997).</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Luhmann distinguishes (heteronomous) mechanical systems / artefacts and
(autonomous) self-organizing systems. The latter comprise <i>organisms</i>,
<i>consciousnesses</i>, and <i>communications</i> as autopoietic systems.
Organisms act in the medium of life, consciousnesses and communications
act in the medium of meaning. We should seriously take into account the
operational closure of autopoietic systems and consider any temporal development
as a co-evolution of isolated systems. This avoids the illusion of control
(through design) in social situations, which always refer to all three domains,
or, "to the whole of life", as John Chris Jones would call it.</p>
<p>The consequences should not be considered as normative or "anti-humanistic"
but as methodological: No analysis of consciousness will ever reveal anything
about communication and vice versa, just as no analysis of mental processes
will reveal anything about brain processes, which are the domain of living
systems. Consciousnesses cannot communicate, but only communication can
communicate. Consciousnesses and communication interact through language.
They have a relation of interpenetration, they make use of each other but
cannot control each other. Our bodies are external to our consciousnesses
and external to communication. There is no place (and no need) for the individual
in the theory ("there are simply too many of them"). The simplistic
and diffuse idea of "man" is avoided, as no super-system encompasses
living, mental and social systems. What man is depends on <i>who</i> is
<i>observing</i> and <i>how</i>.</p>
<p>Consciousnesses, communications, organisms, and artefacts create the
"swamp", which is a provisional metaphor for the interaction /
development of this mess. Design deals with this situation and sticks to
the optimistic opinion that prognosis as to the success of design interventions
is possible. And this (design´s ignorance of its ignorance) is what
makes design so attractive to other disciplines, even to the sciences (Baecker
2000):</p>
<p><i>"Design as a practice of not-knowing will be readable with respect
to various interfaces, but probably the interfaces between technology, body,
psyche and communication will be dominant: as soon as these 'worlds', which,
for themselves, are described by a more or less elaborate knowledge each,
are set into difference to each other, this knowledge disappears and makes
room to experiments, which are the experiments of design. ... Considering
nothing as self-evident here any more, but discovering the potential of
dissolution and recombination everywhere, becomes the playground of a design,
which finally reaches into pedagogy, therapy, and medicine. "</i></p>
<p>This is the <i>scandal of split causality</i>, which systems theory makes
explicit, and which design has always managed without knowing about it.
There is <i>closed causality</i>: the system itself can be described as
a causal system (based on knowing), and there is <i>indeterminable causality</i>:
which implies, that in the environment of a system there may be further
causes whose effects inside the system are indeterminate, because the system
relies on its difference to the environment and its ability to cut chains
of causality (based on not-knowing). It is these gaps, which provide the
locations for models of creativity as well as for models of failure. We
can still talk of causality, but have to keep in mind that it is nothing
but the choice of an observer.</p>
<p>This view implies a change from a concept of design as a causal field
with (still) some white spots into design as an - <i>in principle unpredictable,
non-causal</i> - field with some <i>unconnected islands of causality</i>,
mainly referring to isolated technical or scientific facts. It implies the
<i>renunciation of a scientific knowledge base in favour of a functional
scheme</i>. A knowledge base, due to the necessarily trans-disciplinary
nature of design activities, would have to comprise "everything"
(as Friedman´s canonical lists are impressively demonstrating) yet
without being able to re-connect the islands. Finally it implies the <i>renunciation
of the concept of progress</i>. While design is installing fits between
dynamic systems (which may claim progress for themselves), there is no reasonable
criterion of progress for design itself. Design is evolving.</p>
<p>To go a step further: Design is acting as a kind of, often useful, sometimes
annoying, <i>parasite </i>(Serres 1987), creating interfaces, couplings,
aids, prostheses, meaning, etc. Design is permanently observing the field
for wishes, unsatisfied needs, potential links, seizing the opportunities
that are showing up. Design observation is always second order observation
(observation of observations). Causality, as soon as introduced by an observer,
will be absorbed by uncontrollable deviations and interactions. If the parasite
sounds too negative: others prefer the <i>joker</i>.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>6 A Third Foundation: Theory of Socio-Cultural Evolution</b></p>
<p><b><i>The theory of socio-cultural evolution seems to be a useful framework
to describe the unpredictability of design developments and project outcomes,
thus the limits of causal explanations, in a scientific manner.</i></b></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Simple feedback mechanisms produce the order and chaos of the natural
and social life. The insights on evolution lead evolution theory to conceiving
itself as a result of evolution, which immediately leads to evolutionary
epistemology and so forth. There is abundant evidence for implicit evolutionary
concepts in design theory and methods, even in the most "rigid"
approaches (see for example Roozenburg and Eekels 1991, fig. 5.12). There
are even explicit evolutionary concepts. Hybs and Gero (1992) perceive artefacts
as entities struggling for the survival of the fittest in the hostile environment
of the market. In order to arrive at fresh descriptions, the generalized
concept of <i>evolution</i> should be more rigorously applied to design.
In the following I will refer to Luhmann again, whose theories are closely
related to evolutionary epistemology. In his main oeuvre (1997) he has started
to work out the concept of social evolution.</p>
<p>Firstly, evolution theory is based on the <i>system / environment</i>
distinction. It is this difference, which enables evolution. Secondly, it
does not distinguish historical epochs, but <i>variation</i>, <i>selection</i>,
and <i>re-stabilization</i>. Re-stabilization is the essential condition
for variation and selection being possible at all. Evolution theory serves
for the unfolding of the paradox of the probability of the improbable, thus
explaining the emergence of essential forms and substances from the accidental.
It relieves the order of things of any bond to an origin or form-giving
beginning by simply turning the terminological framework of world-description
upside-down. Evolution theory is neither a theory of progress, nor does
it deliver projections or interpretations of the future. The concept of
autopoietic systems enforces a revision of the theory of "adaptation",
which is a condition, not the goal or outcome of evolution. On the basis
of being adapted it is possible to produce more and more risky ways of non-adaptation
- as long as autopoiesis continues.</p>
<p>The three separated processual components of evolution can be related
to the components of society, conceived as a communicative system:</p>
<p>- <i>Variation</i> varies the <i>elements</i> of the systems, i.e. <i>communications</i>.
Variation means deviating, unexpected, surprising communication. It may
simply be questioning or rejecting expectations of meaning. Variation produces
raw material and provides further communicative connections with wider varieties
of meaning than before.</p>
<p>- <i>Selection</i> relates to the <i>structures</i> of the system. Structures
determine the creation and use of <i>expectations</i> that determine communication
processes. Positive selection means the choice of meaningful relations that
promise a value for building or stabilizing structures. Selections serve
as filters to control the diffusion of variations. Religion has been such
a filter. Truth, money, power, as symbolically generalized media serve as
filters in modern societies.</p>
<p>- <i>Re-stabilization</i> refers to the state of the evolving <i>system</i>
after a positive / negative selection. It has to take care of the <i>system-compatibility</i>
of the selection. Even negative selections have to be re-stabilized, because
they remain in the system's memory. Today stability itself becomes a more
and more dynamic concept, indirectly serving as a trigger for variation.</p>
<p>Variation, selection and re-stabilization can be related to the empirical
reality of evolving systems, thus allowing the re-interpretation of historical
reality in the light of evolution theory. For example:</p>
<p>- Early segmented societies (families, clans, ), where communication
mainly happens as interaction between people present, hardly need the distinction
of variation and selection, because every interaction is aiming at immediate
acceptance or refusal.</p>
<p>- Stratified, hierarchical societies have problems to differentiate between
selection and re-stabilization, because the main criterion for selection
is stability.</p>
<p>- Modern, differentiated societies differentiate variation / selection
as well as selection / re-stabilization, but have problems to distinguish
re-stabilization and variation, because stability is of extremely dynamic
character and provides the trigger of evolutionary variation. Here we may
identify designing, the creation of variety, as a constituent of modernity.</p>
<p>Back to design: The present does not at all mark the wavefront of progress,
but merely consists of what has remained from the past. And so it happens
that we do not live in the best of all possible worlds. Harmony, if at all,
is "post-stabilized" harmony, which we are creating in our narratives.
The study of failed innovations ("floppology") might be a promising
approach to improve designing. The "dark side" of the field is
probably richer than the "best practice" view.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>7 Mind the gaps! Control and Prediction limited</b></p>
<p><b><i>There are two basic problems related to systemic knowledge gaps:</i></b></p>
<p><b><i>(1) The gaps between </i>autopoietic<i> systems involved in designing.
This fundamental systemic "obstinacy" is labelled or covered with
the nice and common but fuzzy terms "creativity", "subjectivity",
"values", "trends", </i></b></p>
<p><b><i>(2) The gaps between the </i>evolutionary<i> mechanisms involved
in designing. Variation, selection, and re-stabilization have to be causally
de-coupled in order to enable the "creative" generation of the
new.</i></b></p>
<p><img src="./Jonas-MindTheGap_files/split causality.gif" align="BOTTOM" width="500" height="243" naturalsizeflag="3"></p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>Fig.:</b> The scandal of split causality: 3 autopoietic systems, artefacts
+ design.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>The previous findings allow us to summarize as follows: Designing consists
of dealing with interacting / co-evolving autopoietic systems and artefacts.
Random mutations as well as deliberate decisions and connections in social
life initiate open-ended processes of self-organization. Positive and negative
feedback interact to produce changing patterns that may at some point assume
relatively stable forms, called fashions or trends, for example. This kind
of mutual causality implies, that it is impossible to exert unilateral control
over any set of variables. Interventions are likely to reverberate throughout
the whole. Though it is often possible to spot an initial "kick"
that sets a system moving in a particular direction, it is important to
realize that such kicks are not really the cause of the end result. They
merely trigger transformations embedded in the logic of the system or the
systems involved. We can identify two problem areas: (1) <i>control</i>,
due to the system / environment distinction, and (2) <i>prediction</i>,
due to the variation / selection / re-stabilization distinction.</p>
<p><i>(1) The problem of control:</i></p>
<p>Luhmann' systems theory provides a map of the possible gaps related to
these interventions, called design activities. Which are the locations,
where the gaps are manifest? We have the following combinations:</p>
<p>- artefacts / organisms</p>
<p>- artefacts / consciousnesses</p>
<p>- artefacts / communications</p>
<p>- artefacts / organisms / communications</p>
<p>- artefacts / consciousnesses / communications</p>
<p>- artefacts / organisms / consciousnesses, and</p>
<p>- artefacts / organisms / consciousnesses / communications.</p>
<p>Artefacts as artefacts are assumed to function; this is not the primary
task of designing. With respect to the autopoietic systems, I introduce
the following gaps, which are always occurring in interaction with different
shares according to the specific design task:</p>
<p>- <i>organisms</i> -> <i>the function gap</i>, which indicates, that
it is not a trivial () task to adapt an artefact to an organism, for example,
because bodies cannot speak</p>
<p>- <i>consciousnesses</i> -> <i>the taste gap</i>, which indicates,
that it is not a trivial () task, to coordinate individual consciousnesses,
for example to optimise a solution for 80 million consumers in the German
market. They are all different, and they cannot speak about their taste
in clear and distinct manner</p>
<p>- <i>communications</i> -> <i>the fashion gap</i>, which indicates,
that it is not a trivial () task to generalize a variety of ambiguous information
gathered from individual consciousnesses and to transfer this into the shape
of artefacts, for example to plan a new collection of household goods for
the Turkish market</p>
<p><i>(2) The problem of prediction:</i></p>
<p>The three separate and independent components of evolution create further
causality splits:</p>
<p><i>- Variation</i> is aiming at alternatives. This is no problem, because
consciousnesses provide abundant "creativity", which is essential
for increasing the variety of choice. This is the "timeless" task
of <i>designing artefacts</i></p>
<p><i>- Selection</i> is aiming at the fit of alternatives into structures.
This is a problem indeed, because communicative structures are detectable,
but not their future stability. To a certain degree, at least, <i>design
research</i> can examine <i>existing structures</i></p>
<p>Single aspects can be tackled by isolated approaches: organism - artefact
gaps by means of ergonomics, consciousness - artefact gaps by means of cognitive
ergonomics, communication - artefact gaps by means of market research, etc.</p>
<p><i>- Re-stabilization</i> is aiming at the integration of selected alternatives
into the system. There is hardly any predictability, because this is a question
of long-term viability within communicative systems. <i>Futures studies</i>
and <i>scenario planning</i> are dealing with <i>evolving systems</i></p>
<p>Design activities intervene into the relations of co-evolving autopoietic
systems by means of creating artefacts that pretend to improve those relations.
The basic problem is neither lacking individual creativity nor insufficient
planning, but the <i>uncontrollable</i> and <i>unpredictable</i> behaviour
of consciousness and communication in the environment of the artefacts.
Design activities are bound to the time-structures of other systems as economy,
science, politics. Design has no "Eigen-time". Its scattered structures
evolve "in-between". The most developed, almost universal, instrument
for bridging this kind of gaps is language, which enables communication.
Functioning communication is highly improbable, as we know. Functioning
design is even more improbable</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>8 Changes in Society and Knowledge Production</b></p>
<p><b><i>Science, just because of its success, faces a shift towards more
project-oriented forms of scientific practice. The inability to deal with
consequences due to the knowledge gaps leads to a "crisis of knowledge":
there is no longer pure "theoretical" knowledge, but rather practical
knowledge in dealing with theory. </i></b></p>
<p><b><i>A "socialization of science" is occurring: science becomes
more visible, is observed, and under growing public "control".
</i></b></p>
<p> </p>
<p>The argument developed so far is supported by changes in society and
knowledge production. High modernity believed in planning, predictability,
progress, and in the inexorable "scientization of society". The
third quarter of the 20th century saw the peak of professionalization and
its deficiencies (e.g. Schön 1983). Since the 1970s we experience severe
transformations in society and in the patterns of knowledge production,
characterized, in a positive notion, as "knowledge society" (Bell
1973), or, more negative, as "risk society" (Beck 1986). In order
to avoid the inappropriate concept of post-modernity we can state that modernity
becomes reflexive. Design has been highly sensitive regarding this development,
as the radical change in the Design Methods Movement around 1970 indicates.</p>
<p>Our activities become more projective and powerful, and at the same time
we realize our inability to predict their consequences. We have to combine
reliable scientific and technological knowledge about interventions with
pure ignorance (not-knowing) of their psychological, social, economic, environmental
consequences into completely new models of acting. Short-term determinacy
changes into long-term uncertainty. The "crisis of knowledge"
(Willke 2002) indicates our inability to manage not-knowing. Earlier societies
had their appropriate mechanisms: traditional societies in the function
of religion or industrial nation states in the function of free entrepreneurship
based on power. If we refer to the concept of <i>form</i> (exposing the
difference underlying our observations, see chapter 5), we can realize that
the corresponding <i>forms of knowledge</i> are knowing / believing and
knowing / power. Both forms of knowledge process their decisions not in
the field of knowing but in the field of not-knowing. In highly complex
secular societies we have to face the cruelty of a concept of knowledge,
which finds its other side neither in faith nor in making or power but in
not-knowing itself. We are no longer able to shift the burden of not-knowing
to the distance of transcendental symbolizations or the immediacy of enforced
making.</p>
<p>This shift of concepts may appear as an academic exercise, but it reveals
the possibility and necessity to escape from cognitive deadlocks by means
of tackling problems from the other side of the distinction. Pragmatically
spoken: the acquisition of competence in dealing with uncertainty means
that we have to make the right mistakes faster than others.</p>
<p>Nowotny et.al. (2001) characterize the same development as a shift from
"Mode-1" to "Mode-2 society". The interfaces between
state, markets, culture are increasingly blurred. The relatively autonomous
spaces these systems occupied, were products of the modern differentiation,
as was science. The scheme of functional differentiation is dissolving in
parts. The new program of the French CNRS reveals this shift from traditional
disciplines to interdisciplinary problem fields. Moreover, the CNRS introduces
the institution of "citizens´ conferences" (Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung 26.03.2002). In Mode-2 society a new relation of society
and science is showing up which might be labelled the "socialization
of science", or, the shift from Mode-1 to Mode-2 knowledge production.
Science and society become transgressive, i.e. not only that science can
speak to society (it always could), but rather that society speaks back
to science. Innovation is the centrepiece of a new contract between science
and society. Science moves into the <i>agora</i> (Nowotny et. al. 2001:
201): <i>" Science is no longer outside, either as a cognitive or quasi-religious
authority or as an autonomous entity with its special access to the reality
of nature.". </i></p>
<p>It is just because of its success, that science has come under more pressure
to deliver effective solutions to a wide range of increasingly complex problems.
Thus science is being drawn into the production of <i>contextualized knowledge</i>.
Contextualization happens through the shift from a "segregation"
to an "integration" model (from a discipline focus to a problem
focus, or, from subject-oriented science to project-oriented research),
through the increase in uncertainty and the related "Darwinian"
mechanisms of variation and selective retention, and through greater awareness
of the place of "people" (actively involved in the production,
conceptualised as either objects of research and / or as addressees of ensuing
policies).</p>
<p><i>Mode-2 knowledge production</i> implies, that</p>
<p>- the separation of basic and applied research is blurred (e.g. quantum
computers),</p>
<p>- the separation of natural and artificial, of science (what is) and
design (what could be) becomes fuzzy (e.g. genetic design),</p>
<p>- the distinction of facts and values becomes a problem,</p>
<p>- the context of application is extended towards a context of implication,</p>
<p>- the focus changes from reliable to socially robust knowledge,</p>
<p>- the concept of "context of discovery" vs. "context of
justification" becomes obsolete,</p>
<p>- ...</p>
<p>Seen from this perspective <i>there is no longer any "theoretical"
knowledge, but rather practical knowledge in dealing with theory. There
is no "abstract" knowledge, but rather practical knowledge in
dealing with abstractions</i>.</p>
<p>The "hard" epistemic core of autonomous self-referential science,
which scientists have struggled to articulate and to defend, is weakening.
It is not empty but crowded and heterogeneous. This is not some sudden paradigm-shift
from science to non-science, or from universal standards of objectivity
to locally determined relativism, but the latest stage in a process of adjustment
to an increasingly complex reality. Maybe the situation can be characterized
as an uncoupling of modernization from modernity. The processes of innovation
are separated from the values on which they were once assumed to rely.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>9 Design as a Non-Modern Discipline - Science Approaches Design</b></p>
<p><b><i>Design, in a smaller scale, has always been the expert discipline
of dealing with not-knowing. Both design and science are based on circular
processes of inquiry. They (still) differ in their purposes and outputs
and in the criteria of evaluating these outputs. Nevertheless science becomes
more "design-like". </i></b></p>
<p><b><i>Therefore design is requested to sharpen its, in main parts, non-modern
profile instead of striving at adaptation to a traditional and weakening
concept of science (</i>-><i> questions 2, 4).</i></b></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Basically humans are "universal dilettantes". The functional
differentiation of societies de-valuated this trans-competence. Design,
as a product of modernity, comes into being as a mediating interface between
the making and the use of artefacts. Design professionalizes the competence
of "universal dilettantism"; the human poietic drive is compensated
by Do-It-Yourself industries. Functional differentiation of societies is
the paradox foundation of design, paradox, because, at the same time, design,
as a cheeky "un-discipline", rejects this separation, permanently
meddling in everything. In this sense, because it is orthogonal to the operational
closure of autopoietic systems, it is orthogonal to the traditional strategies
of modernisation. Design has never really been modern. And therefore it
may serve as a model for dealing with the conflicts of modernity.</p>
<p>On the other hand there is increasing evidence that scientific research
practice resembles designerly ways of acting and reasoning. A "third
way", a more nuanced and sociologically sensitive epistemology is needed
which incorporates the "soft" individual, social and cultural
visions as well as the "hard" body of its knowledge. Recently
I formulated three theses regarding design (Jonas 2001), which can be related
to science and the concepts of Mode-2 society and Mode-2 knowledge production.</p>
<p><i>(1) Design must fit and so must science.</i></p>
<p>This refers to the interface concept of design. The growing contextualization
of <i>scientific practice</i> shifts the emphasis from internal coherence
of its findings towards fitness with respect to its contexts.</p>
<p><i>(2) Design never ends and so does science.</i></p>
<p>This refers to design as a projective discipline, trying to transfer
existing situations into preferred ones. Once the problem is solved, the
solution becomes the nucleus of a new problem. The new <i>scientific</i>
criterion of social robustness requires permanent feedback with its context
in the agora. Contextualized scientific problems are never solved either
(Carroll 1996: 151, 152):</p>
<p><i>"´Now! Now!´ cried the Queen. ´Faster! Faster!´
And they went so fast that at last they seemed to skim through the air,
hardly touching the ground with their feet, till suddenly, just as Alice
was getting quite exhausted, they stopped, and she found herself sitting
on the ground, breathless and giddy.</i></p>
<p><i>The Queen propped her up against a tree, and said kindly, ´You
may rest a little, now.´</i></p>
<p><i>Alice looked round her in great surprise. ´Why, I do believe
we´ve been under this tree the whole time! Everything´s just
as it was!´</i></p>
<p><i>´Of course it is´, said the Queen. ´What would you
have it?´</i></p>
<p><i>´Well, in our country´, said Alice, still panting a little,
´you´d generally get somewhere else if you ran very fast
for a long time as we´ve been doing.´</i></p>
<p><i>´A slow sort of country!´ said the Queen. ´Now,
here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same
place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as
fast as that! "</i></p>
<p><i>(3) Design is a special art and so is science.</i></p>
<p>Design does not have to be ashamed of its pre-rational relicts. There
are mysterious aspects in designing, whatever we name them: intuition, creativity,
insights, or chance, as I would prefer. Heisenberg, comparing mental images
with their final mathematical models, suggests a complementary view of knowledge
production, even in the "very hard" sciences (Miller 1996: 319,
320):</p>
<p><i>"... And, of course, then you try to give this picture some definite
form in words or in mathematical formula. Then what frequently happens later
on is that the mathematical formulation of the ´picture´ or
the formulation of the ´picture´ in words, turns out to be rather
wrong. Still the experimental guesses are rather right, that is, the actual
´picture´ which you had in mind was much better than the rationalization
which you tried to put down in the publication. That is, of course, a quite
normal situation, because the rationalization, as everyone knows, is always
a later stage and not the first stage. ..."</i></p>
<p>Design has never been strictly modern in a Mode-1 sense, and the discipline
should not struggle for modernity in a situation when science and society
and other "Sciences of the Artificial" (BJM 2001) are leaving
important aspects of modernity behind. Design might be conceptualised as
an agency of modernization (innovation), uncoupled from the ideals of modernity,
situated <i>between</i> the established scientific and professional spaces
and expert disciplines. And this is its very strength. Wiener (1948) argued
that the promising fields for the flourishing of science are those, which
have been neglected between the accepted disciplines. Cybernetics was a
product of concrete design problems. Further disciplines may emerge from
those fertile nowhere-lands. But design itself will remain in the swamp,
or, more precisely, design will remain the evolutionary swamp, where the
potential paths of meaning can grow and materialize; or the not-yet-wired
brain, where the axons search their connections: hypothetical, explorative,
speculative</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>10 Don't believe in foundations - Design as an Ironic Discipline</b></p>
<p><b><i>The more "true" and thus normative design foundations
claim to be, the more counter-productive they are. Systemic irony is the
optimal strategy against soporific truths and fixed standards. The temporal
circularity (= "spirality") of making, observing, theorizing,
planning, making, ... with its indicated consequences as to consequences
seems to be the ultimate foundation. </i></b></p>
<p><b><i>In design research we cannot but follow Feyerabend (-> question
5).</i></b></p>
<p><b><i>Feierabend! (That's it for today!)</i></b></p>
<p> </p>
<p>To sum up: We are facing the paradox situation of increasing manipulative
power through science and technology, even concerning natural evolution
itself, and at the same time decreasing prognostic control.
Design is acting evolutionary, regarding its function (design processes)
as well as regarding the creation of own improbable order as a discipline
(disciplinary structures and theoretical foundations). Design theory has
to create a fit between itself (as an artefact) and its environment, which
consists of social conditions, fashionable theories, values, etc. There
is self-similarity of the processes of designing and the processes of disciplinary
development. Maybe <i>temporal circularity</i> (as in <i>action research)</i>
is the only useful process model in design practice as well as in design
theory building.</p>
<p>I am suggesting a U-turn in perspective, a "paradigm shift",
if you like. The primary learning effect after 40 years of design research
might be to reduce the claim of explanation and justification as well as
completeness and coherence of theoretical models. <i>Functional equivalents</i>,
which describe the dynamics of design processes on multiple levels, seem
to be more promising than normative <i>stocks of knowledge</i> and rules.
The gain in interpretative potential will compensate for the loss of explanatory
power. Instead of expanding the islands of apparent scientific rationality
(which frequently turn out to be unsafe), we cross the border from knowing
to not-knowing. And on this side of the border we can determine (with scientific
underpinning!) the areas of <i>safe non-predictability</i>.</p>
<p>Accepting the limits of scientific foundations in the creation of the
new, requires a new self-concept for design indeed. Broadbent (2002) proposes
a "guidance system" for socio-cultural evolution, which sounds
rather ambitious, even arrogant. I would suggest, to be a bit more modest.
But of course we should stick to the sympathetic and presumptuous (and a
bit naïve) professional claim to increase the quality of life. This
means that our theory must acquire traits of an <i>ironic theory</i>, for
only irony is able to combine modesty and arrogance.</p>
<p>- We know Socratic irony (I know that I do not know) as the core of the
maieutic approach, which has always been an element of good planning.</p>
<p>- We know romantic irony, as the elegant play of genius. Applied to one's
own capability this kind of irony deconstructs and confirms the own superiority
at the same time.</p>
<p>- We know Rorty's (1989) irony concept with its permanent sceptic regarding
closed and finite vocabularies.</p>
<p>- And we have "systemic irony", which claims to be a competence
of reflective dealing with fundamental uncertainty. The latter means that
it cannot be dissolved through patient reflection, but rather extends in
the course of reflecting it, because every observation opens up new fields
of not (yet) observed phenomena. The other side of systemic irony is not
certainty, but nothing else than the unavoidable paradox of knowing. Exactly
in this sense Schlegel stated (quoted from Willke 2002): <i>"Ironie
ist die Form der Paradoxie." Es ist "klares Bewußtsein ...
des unendlich vollen Chaos."</i></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>References</b></p>
<p><b>Albert, Hans</b> (1968) <i>Traktat über kritische Vernunft</i>,
Tübingen</p>
<p><b>Baecker, Dirk</b> (2000) "Die Theorieform des Systems" <i>Soziale
Systeme</i> 6 (2000), H. 2, Opladen, Leske + Budrich, S. 213-236</p>
<p><b>Beck, Ulrich</b> (1986) <i>Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine
andere Moderne</i> Frankfurt / M. Suhrkamp</p>
<p><b>Bell, Daniel</b> (1973) <i>The Coming of Post-Industrial Society</i>
London, Heinemann</p>
<p><b>BJM </b>(2001)<b> <i>British Journal of Management</i></b> Volume
12, Special Issue on Mode-2 knowledge production, December 2001</p>
<p><b>Blackmore, Susan</b> (1999) <i>The Meme Machine</i> Oxford, Oxford
University Press</p>
<p><b>Broadbent, John</b> (2002) "Generations in design methodology"
<i>Common Ground</i>, Proceedings of DRS International Conference, London
5-8 September 2002</p>
<p><b>Buchanan, Richard </b>(2001) "Children of the Moving Present:
The Ecology of Culture and the Search for Causes in Design" <i>Design
Issues</i> 17: 1 pp67-84</p>
<p><b>Campbell, D.T.</b> (1974) "Evolutionary epistemology" in
Schlipp, P.A (ed.) <i>The Philosophy of Karl Popper</i> Vol. 1: 413-463,
Open Court Publishing, La Salle, IL</p>
<p><b>Common Ground</b> (2002) Proceedings of DRS International Conference,
London 5-8 September 2002, edited by David Durling and John P. Shackleton</p>
<p><b>Cross, Nigel</b> (2001) "Designerly Ways of Knowing: Design Discipline
Versus Design Science" <i>Design Issues</i> Volume 17, Number 3 Summer
2001: 49-55</p>
<p><b>Dawkins, Richard (</b>1976) <i>The Selfish Gene</i> Oxford, Oxford
University Press</p>
<p><b>Dewey, John</b> (1986) <i>Logic: The Theory of Inquiry</i> Carbondale
1986 (1938), Southern Illinois University Press,</p>
<p><b>Dunne, Anthony; Raby, Fiona</b> (2001) <i>Design Noir: The Secret
Life of Electronic Objects</i> Basel Boston Berlin, August / Birkhäuser</p>
<p><b>Feyerabend, Paul</b> (1976) <i>Wider den Methodenzwang. Skizze einer
anarchistischen Erkenntnistheorie</i> Frankfurt / M., Suhrkamp</p>
<p><b>Friedman, Ken (</b>2001) "Problem and paradox in foundations
of design" in Jonas, Wolfgang (ed.) <i>the basic PARADOX</i> http://www.thebasicparadox.de</p>
<p><b>Glanville, Ranulph</b> (2001) "Researching design and designing
research" in Jonas, Wolfgang (ed.) <i>the basic PARADOX</i> http://www.thebasicparadox.de</p>
<p><b>Hybs, Ivan; Gero, John S.</b> (1992) "An evolutionary process
model of design" <i>Design Studies</i> Vol 13 No 3 July 1992 pp 273-290</p>
<p><b>Jonas, Wolfgang </b></p>
<p>(1999) "On the Foundations of a ´Science of the Artificial´"
<i>useful and critical - the position of research in design</i> International
Conference, Helsinki, Sept. 1999</p>
<p>(2000) "The paradox endeavour to design a foundation for a groundless
field" <i>International conference on design education in the university</i>,
Perth, Dec. 2000</p>
<p>(2001-2003) http://www.thebasicparadox.de and forthcoming publications</p>
<p>(2002) "Common Ground - a product or a process?" <i>Common
Ground</i>, Proceedings of DRS International Conference, London 5-8 September
2000</p>
<p><b>Love, Terence</b> (2002) "Learning from the design-science paradox:
new foundations for a field of design" in Jonas, Wolfgang (ed.) <i>the
basic PARADOX</i> http://www.thebasicparadox.de</p>
<p><b>Luhmann, Niklas</b></p>
<p>(1984) <i>Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie</i>
Frankfurt / M., Suhrkamp</p>
<p>(1997) <i>Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft</i> Frankfurt / M., Suhrkamp</p>
<p><b>Miller, Arthur I.</b> (1996) <i>Insights of Genius. Imagery and Creativity
in Science and Art</i> New York, Copernicus</p>
<p><b>Nowotny, Helga; Scott, Peter; Gibbons, Michael</b> (2001) <i>Re-Thinking
Science. Knowledge and the Public in the Age of Uncertainty</i> Cambridge,
UK, Polity Press</p>
<p><b>Riedl, Rupert (2000) <i>Strukturen der Komplexität. Eine Morphologie
des Erkennens und Erklärens</i></b> Berlin Heidelberg New York, Springer</p>
<p><b>Roozenburg, N.F.M.; Eekels, J.</b> (1991) <i>Product Design: Fundamentals
and Methods</i> Chichester, Wiley</p>
<p><b>Rorty, Richard</b> (1989) <i>Contingency, irony, and solidarity</i>
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press</p>
<p><b>Schön, Donald A.</b> (1983) <i>The Reflective Practitioner. How
Professionals Think in Action</i> Basic Books</p>
<p><b>Serres, Michel</b> (1987) <i>Der Parasit</i> Frankfurt / M., Suhrkamp</p>
<p><b>Wiener, Norbert</b> (1948) <i>Cybernetics or control and communication
in the animal and the machine</i> Cambridge, MIT Press</p>
<p><b>Willke, Helmut</b> (2002) Dystopia. Studien zur Krisis des Wissens
in der modernen Gesellschaft Frankfurt / M., Suhrkamp<br>
</p>
<p> </p>
<p><b>Biographical note</b></p>
<p>Born 1953, study of naval architecture 1971-76 at the Technical University
of Berlin, research on the computer-aided optimisation of streamlined shapes,
PhD in 1983. 1984-87 consulting engineer for companies of the automobile
industry and the German standardisation institute.</p>
<p>Since 1988 teaching (CAD, industrial design) and research (system theory
and design theory) at the University of Arts Berlin and at the University
of Wuppertal. 1994 lecturing qualification (Habilitation) in design theory.
1994 2001 professor for "process design" at the University
of Art and Design Halle / Burg Giebichenstein. Since 10/2001 professor for
"design theory" at the Universtiy of Arts Bremen.
</p></body></html>